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court in Logan Valley failed to recognize the burdens concomitant to
those rights when that property changes from private to quasi-public.
EDWARD F. SCHIFF
INCREASED SENTENCE UPON RETRIAL
Under current criminal practice whenever a defendant seeks re-
versal of his conviction and a retrial,' he subjects himself to the risk of
an increased sentence upon retrial. The Supreme Court of the United
States recently described a defendant's dilemma: "For Noia to have
appealed in 1942 would have been to run a substantial risk of electrocu-
tion. His was the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprison-
ment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful,
might well have led to retrial and death sentence." 2 In Patton v. North
Carolina3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recognized that risk and found that a defendant should not have to
face the possibility of augmented punishment on retrial.
In Patton the defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of
Bladen County, North Carolina in October, ig6o, of armed robbery
and sentenced to twenty years in prison. He was unrepresented by
counsel at trial and did not appeal. In April, 1964, he obtained a
post-conviction hearing and was awarded a new trial. On February
17, 1965, defendant was retried, convicted, and again sentenced to
twenty years in prison. At the time of defendant's reconviction he had
served nearly five years of his original sentence. The judge in pronounc-
ing sentence stated that he would give defendant five more years than
he had been given originally, but since he had served nearly five
years he would credit that time against the new sentence.4 Thus, de-
fendant was again sentenced to twenty years.
In August, 1965, defendant sought and obtained federal habeas
'A defendant who obtains a reversal of his conviction is not put twice in
jeopardy by being retried. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
2Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963).
3381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
'The trial judge said: "Before I announce punishment, I will take into con-
sideration the fact that he has served four years, or nearly five years .... I would
give you five more years than what I am giving you, but I am allowing you credit
for the time that you have served. Judgment of the Court is that the Defendant
be imprisoned in the State's Prison for a term of twenty years...." 381 F.2d at
637 n..
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corpus relief.5 On the state's appeal the court held that it was a viola-
tion of the due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy clauses
of the United States Constitution to increase the defendant's sen-
tence on retrial. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant
must be given credit for all time served under the invalidated sen-
tence and that his original sentence could not be increased.
A trial judge6 may increase a defendant's sentence following his
conviction on retrial in two ways: (I) by increasing the length of the
original sentence7 and (2) by denying the defendant credit for time
served under the invalidated sentence.8 There are various reasons why
the judge might increase the defendant's sentence. The state may have
presented more damaging evidence against the defendant at the new
trial;9 the defendant's conduct before and during his new trial, or
5Tatton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966). Defendant did
not appeal from his second conviction. However, the court of appeals held that
defendant had exhausted his state remedies because it would be "futile" to seek
state appellate review in view of the law of North Carolina. 381 F.2d at 637.
61n certain circumstances the jury may be the sentencing authority. See, e.g.,
State v. Aston, 412 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. 1967). Nevertheless, the rule of Patton should
still apply.
FSee, e.g., Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. Slade, 264
N.C. 70 , 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
81n Patton the court recognized the effect of the trial judge's sentencing de-
cision stating: "Regardless of whether the action of the sentencing judge is verb-
alized as a twenty-year sentence without credit for the five years already served, or
as a twenty-five-year sentence with credit, the practical effect of the second judge's
sentence is -to compel the defendant to serve five years longer . " 381 F.2d at
637. The court held that a harsher sentence was impermissible whether it was
the result of an increase in the original sentence or of a denial of credit. How-
ever, the denial of credit does not always result in an increase in defendant's
sentence. For example, if defendant is originally sentenced to twenty years, serves
four years and then, after being retried, is sentenced to ten years without credit,
his sentence has not been increased. Only if the defendant's new sentence exceeds
sixteen years will the denial of credit result in an actual increased sentence.
Generally, when credit is denied most courts approach the problem merely
as a matter of credit without regard to the fact that the denial of credit often
increases defendant's sentence. See, e.g., Newman v. Rodriguez, 375 F.2d 712
(0oth Cir. 1967); McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947). The
problem of credit also arises in non-retrial cases where defendant only seeks review
of the sentence. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 404 Ill. 624, 89 N.E.2d 822 (195o). For
discussions of denial of credit see Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence
or Conviction-A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. R v. 1 (1963);
Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the
Laws, 35 MINN. L. REv. 239 (1951).
PSee, e.g., Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967) (additional testi-
mony rejected as basis for increase); People v. Henderson, 6o Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d
677, 687, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963) (dictum, dissenting opinion). Quite often, much
more evidence is presented at the second trial because defendant changes his plea
to not guilty and the state has to present more evidence to convict him. United
1968]
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similar matters brought out in the presentence report, may have
merited an increase; 10 the judge at the second trial may have ideas
about sentencing different from those of the judge at the first trial;"
or the defendant may have been convicted of different charges on re-
trial.' 2 When faced with the question of the propriety of the increase,
whatever the reason, courts generally have held that an increase is
permissible.' 3
The explanation most often given by courts for upholding in-
creased sentences is that the new trial stands in the trial court as if
there had never been an earlier trial.' 4 The first trial is said to be a
States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8 (3 d Cir. 1967). There is no question
that the state may enter new evidence against the defendant at retrail. United
States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 US. 233 (1957).
10United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7 th Cir. 1967). It may be found, for
example, that rehabilitation may take longer than calculated when defendant was
first sentenced.
'See, e.g., Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (sst Cir. 1967); Gainey v.
Turner, 266 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
12See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965); State v. Squires,
248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 6ol (1966).
13 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 471-72
(1963) (dictum, dissenting opinion); United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.
1967); United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8 (3d Cir. 1967) (increase
allowed on fewer counts); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967)
(dictum) (increase allowed if based on presentence report); Short v. United States,
344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (if the "increase serves a valid purpose'); King v.
United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (dictum); Rice v. Simpson, 2 CuM. L.
REP. 2o68 (D. Ala. Sept. 26, 1967) (if there is "legal justification" for the increase);
Bohannon v. District of Columbia, 99 A.2d 647 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); Hobbs
v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); Moon v. State, 232 A.2d 277 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1967); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 89, 185 N.E.2d 739 (1962)
(dictum); Sanders v. State, 241 Miss. 894, 125 So. 2d 923 (ig6i) (dictum) (permitting
increase when judge determined sentence but suggesting different result if jury
fixed the punishment); State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966); State
v. Slade, 264 N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965); State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d
205 (1964); State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964); Commonwealth
v. Davis, 203 Pa. Super. 79, 198 A.2d 649 (1964); State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149
S.E.2d 6oi (1962) (dictum).
Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945), has also been cited for the
proposition that a sentence can be increased on retrial. There defendant's sentence
was increased from life imprisonment to death on retrial. On writ of certiorari
the court of appeal's judgment was affirmed but without reference to the increased
sentence. The Court only entertained the question of the court's statutory authority
to impose the dea-th sentence under the Federal Kidnapping Act. Therefore,
Robinson is questionable authority for allowing an increase on retrial.
"See, e.g., United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3 d Cir. 1967);
Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136
S.E.2d 205 (1964). In Starner the court said: "When he appeared and entered a
plea of not guilty at the second trial, the slate had been wiped clean and it was
an entirely new case and bore no relationship whatsoever to his previous plea
of guilty which he had entered." 378 F.2d at 811.
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nullity15 and, therefore, cannot limit the new trial or sentence.16 The
defendant is held to have waived all the consequences of the first trial
and "takes a chance after conviction on the trial judge's discretion
in sentencing him."' 7 By electing to appeal he is held to have accepted
the benefits and the risks of a new trial.'s
A factor which has led some appellate courts to permit increased
sentences is the trial judge's discretion in sentencing matters. The gen-
eral rule is that the length of the sentence is a matter within the trial
judge's discretion.' 9 Therefore, courts are reluctant to interfere with
the trial judge's sentencing decision because they feel that he is in
the best position to determine the appropriate sentence and that
his evaluation should be honored.20 However, courts have failed to
recognize that the same rationale should apply to prohibit the judge
at the new trial from changing or increasing the original sentence.
The rule is that a judge's discretionary evaluation should be hon-
ored; therefore, the judge at the new trial should not be allowed to
alter the original sentencing decision of the judge at the first trial.
To do so would be to interfere with the discretion vested in the judge
at the first trial. However, this problem has been circumvented by the
rule that a new trial "results in a retrial of the whole case, verdict,
judgment, and sentence."
21
In some jurisdictions the appellate court will not intervene to
prohibit an increase as long as the sentence is within the statutory
limit.22 Futhermore, the trial judge does not have to give any reason
for the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial.2
lzCommonwealth v. Davis, 203 Pa. Super. 79, 198 A.2d 649 (1964).
AOther courts have sought to justify an increase on grounds that the risk of
an increase is necessary to discourage frivolous appeals. See People v. Henderson,
60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 691, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963) (dissent). Contra, State
v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 3o, 216 A.2d 586 (1966).
As to the problem of increasing a sentence where defendant appeals from
an inferior court to a court of general jurisdiction see Moulden v. State, 217 Md.
351, 142 A.2d 595 (1958).
'7United States ex reL Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8, 811 (3d Cir. 1967); accord,
State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964). Contra, Short v. United States,
344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); Bohannon v. District of
Columbia, 99 A.2d 647 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
" Leach v. United States, 353 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Miller v. Gladden, 341
F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700 (4 th Cir. 1965).
2United States ex tel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8 (3 d Cir. 1967); Shear v.
Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
nState v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205, 20o6 (1964).
'Bohannon v. District of Columbia, 99 A.2d 647 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953);
State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964); Commonwealth v. Davis, 203
Pa. Super. 79, 198 A.2d 649 (1964).
=United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8 (3d Cir. 1967); United
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Regardless of the grounds used to justify the increase most courts
have been quick to denounce any retributive intent on the part of
the judge.24 The problem of retributive intent usually has arisen
where there is a possibility that the judge increased the defendant's
sentence for exercising his right of appeal. 25 If that is the reason
for the increase, then it must be struck down.2 6 However, it is almost
impossible for the defendant to show any misconduct or vindictive
attitude of the judge toward the defendant in order to upset the in-
crease.27 The difficulty in showing the judge's prejudicial conduct is
especially acute where the judiciary is held to be above such conduct.28
The propriety of increasing a defendant's sentence after a retrial is
presented most keenly in those cases where the defendant was given
a life sentence at the first trial and was sentenced to death upon re-
trial. The courts have not been reluctant to sanction an increase even
under these circumstances.2 9 The possibility of reconviction and
sentence to death is held to be one of the "risks" the defendant takes
by exercising his right of appeal30 However, recent cases indicate a
trend against permitting an increase from life imprisonment to death.3 '
Some courts have recognized that the prospect of an increase
States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7 th Cir. 1967). Contra, Rice v. Simpson, 2 CRIM.
L. REP. 2o68 (D. Ala. Sept. 26, 1967).
"See, e.g., Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
'Meaders v. State, 96 Ga. 299, 22 S.E. 527 (1895) (fine increased on defendant's
notice of motion for new trial-appellate court expressed disapproval); State v.
Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942) (sentence increased after notice of
appeal given-sentence stricken since it appeared that sentence was increased be-
cause defendant expressed desire to appeal). But see State v. Bostic, 242 N.C. 639,
89 S.E.2d 261 (1955) (imprisonment increased on defendant's rejection of sentence
and notice of appeal-no penalization by trial court found).
nUnited States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); Short v. United States,
344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965); State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942).
See also United States v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786 (4 th Cir. 1965). In Boyce the court
said: "If it had been the intent of the trial judge to dissuade the exercise of the
right of appeal we should be quick to condemn the practice, but such was not
the case here." 352 F.2d at 787 (dictum).
2See, e.g., United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 8o8 (3 d Cir. 1967);
Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4 th Cir. 1967); United States v. White, 382
F.2d 445 (7 th Cir. 1967).
2See, e.g., Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
2See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Mann v. State, 23 Fla.
610, 3 So. 207 (1887) (dictum); State v. Kneeskern, 203 Iowa 929, 21o N:W. 465
(1926); State v. Morgan, 145 La. 585, 82 So. 711 (sgg); Commonwealth v. Alessio,
313 Pa. 537, 169 A. 764 (1934) (dictum); Greer v. State, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxter) 321
(1874).
wMann v. State, 23 Fla. 61o, 3 So. 207 (1887).
31Rush v. State, 239 Ark. 878, 395 S.W.2d 3 (1965) (interpreting statute); People
v. Henderson, 6o Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); State v. Wolf,
46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966).
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hinders defendant's right of appeal.32 In Marano v. United States
33
the court stated that "a defendant's right of appeal must be unfet-
tered"3 4 and that defendant "should not have to fear even the pos-
sibility that his exercise of his right to appeal will result in the im-
position of a direct penalty for so doing."35 The court, without saying
so, apparently based its unfettered appeal approach on the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.3 6
There are four constitutional objections that might be directed
against an increase in sentence. It may be said an increase in sentence
imposes cruel and unusual punishment,3 7 denies defendant due
process,38 denies defendant equal protection of the laws,3 9 and puts
defendant twice in jeopardy.4 0 Where the eighth amendment provision
3 4Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967); People v. Henderson,
6o Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 8oi,
216 A.2d 586 (1965). In Henderson and Wolf, where increases from life to death
were prohibited, the courts, though basing their decisions on other grounds,
suggested that the unfettered appeal approach would require the same result. In
an analogous situation the court in In re Ferguson, 233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 325 (1965), held that defendant's sentence could not be increased because
to hold otherwise would discourage motions for new trial.
1374 F.2d 583 (ist Cir. 1967). Marano delt with an increase in sentence imposed
by a federal court.
31374 F.2d at 585; accord, Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (ist Cir.
1966). The Supreme Court of the United States has never held that a defendant
has a constitutional right of appeal, but it has held that if that right is provided,
it must be unhindered by unreasoned distinctions. "This court has never held
that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is
now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
-374 F.2d at 585. The court held that an increase could not be based on addi-
tional testimony at the new trial but reopened the door and undermined its whole
opinion concerning the right of appeal by further stating in dictum that an in-
crease could be based on the presentence report.
18Courts have been reluctant to approach the matter on any constitutional
basis. For example, in United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 1967),
the court, in allowing an increased sentence, said: "We are fully aware of the
recent decisions of other courts ... which have expressed views contrary in many
respects to those expressed herein. We think, however, that the pronouncement
of a constitutional principle as sweeping and inflexible as [a blanket prohibition
against any increase in sentence on retrial] ... should await the considered judgment
of the Supreme Court...."
r"Excessive bail shall not be required ... nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
3 4"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law .. " U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § s.
3 "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
"0"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
1968]
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against cruel and unusual punishment has been raised, it has been
held uniformly that the augmentation of sentence on reconviction
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
41
The three remaining constitutional objections were presented in
Patton and applied as the basis for denying any increase. The court
first held that an increase in sentence denies defendant due process.
Encompassed as part of the court's due process argument are the un-
constitutional condition doctrine and the unfettered appeal approach.
42
Under the unconstitutional condition doctrine a state cannot condition
the extension of a state-bestowed right upon the relinquishment of a
constitutional right.43 However, the doctrine may be applied in the
reverse. Thus, a state cannot condition the extension of a constitu-
tional right upon the relinquishment of a state-bestowed right. In
Patton the court applied a variation of the latter rule holding that a
state cannot condition a defendant's exercise of his right to a fair
trial by subjecting him to the risk of an increased sentence.4 4 Other
courts when presented with the due process objection have held that
an increased sentence upon reconviction does not deny defendant
due process.
45
"United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967); Hobbs
v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. Slade, 264 N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d
723 (1965)-
1-See text accompanying note 32 supra.
"See Note, -Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (196o).
"To say that defendant has to subject himself to the risk of an increased
sentence in order to exercise the right to a fair trial is the same as saying that
a defendant has to relinquish the immunity accorded the prior sentence in order
to exercise the right to a fair trial. Because a defendant's immunity from an in-
creased sentence in the absence of a self-initiated appeal is a right guaranteed
by the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall) 163 (1873); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931) (dictum), the court's
application of the doctrine appears fallacious. The uncontitutional condition
doctrine relates only to the interplay between state and constitutional rights, not
between constitutional rights alone. Furthermore, in seeking to obtain a fair trial
a defendant does not have to barter his right of appeal. Instead, he exercises that
right as a means of implementing the right to a fair trial. It would have been
accurate if the court had simply held that it was a violation of the due process
clause to require the defendant to subject himself to the risk of an increased
sentence in order to obtain a fair trial and avoided the use of the unconstitutional
condition doctrine.
"Moon v. State, 232 A.2d 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967); State v. White, 262
N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. loo5 (1965). However, it has
been held that an increase does deny defendant due process if the court does not
state in the record some reason or legal justification for the increase, Rice v.
Simpson, 2 CuM. L. REP. 2o68 (D. Ala. Sept. 26, 1967), or if it is to penalize
defendant for exercising his right of appeal, United States v. White, 382 F.2d
445 (7 th Cir. 1967).
1968] CASE COMMENTS 67
Patton appears to be the first case to apply the equal protection
clause to prohibit any increase.4 6 The defendant's sentence may not be
increased once he has commenced serving itY' Therefore, he has
freedom from harsher punishment under the original sentence un-
less he challenges the sentence or conviction. Thus, defendant is denied
equal protection of the laws because only those defendants who seek
review of a sentence or obtain a reversal and a new trial are subjected
to harsher punishment; and conversely, only those defendants who
remain content with their judgment receive the benefit of the rule
against increasing a defendant's sentence after he has begun serving
it. To allow an upward revision of the sentence the state "must pro-
ceed upon a rational basis in selecting the class of prisoners it will
subject to this threat."48
Finally, the court in Patton based its decision on the double
jeopardy clause. The increased penalty was held to violate the "pro-
hibition against multiple punishment." 49 Other courts have entertained
this question and found that harsher punishment upon retrial does
not put defendant twice in jeopardy.50
The effect of the court's decision in Patton is to place a ceiling
on regentencing.51 The original sentence acts as a maximum limita-
"In Rice v. Simpson, 2 Cium. L. REP. 2068 (D. Ala. Sept. 26, 1967), the court
said that an increased sentence could not withstand an equal protection objection
if there was no "legal justification" for the increase recorded in the court record.
But in State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), the court completely re-
jected an equal protection argument.
'TEx parte Lange, 85 U.S. (8 Wall.) 163 (1873); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
3o4 (1931) (dictum); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 2o (6th Cir. 1966).
49381 F.2d at 642. The court found no rational basis for favoring only the
defendants who do not seek post-conviction review.
'9381 F.2d at 645. Patton did not follow the usual double jeopardy approach
that prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Instead, the court said
that allowing an increase on retrial was the equivalent of multiple punishment
resulting from an increase in defendant's sentence after he has begun serving it.
OSee, e.g., United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); King v. United
States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (dictum). In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
15 (igig), a double jeopardy argument was directed against the retrial, and when
the Court allowed the increase in sentence from life to death, it found no double
jeopardy objection on any basis. However, in People v. Henderson, 6o Cal. 2d 482,
386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963), the court applied the double jeopardy clause
to prohibit an increase from life imprisonment to death.
5"That a ceiling should be imposed has been contended on several occasions.
In re Ferguson, 233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1965); ABA, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PosT CONVICTION REMfEDIES 96 (See discussion of the ABA report in note
52 infra); Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. Rrv. 1, 19 (1963); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's
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tion on any sentence that may subsequently be given at the new trial.5
2
Therefore, the defendant is free to appeal without fear of having
harsher punishment imposed on him if he is successful in attacking
the original conviction. If his incarceration is based on a defective
conviction, he will be encouraged to attack it and uncover the defects.
To the extent that Patton places a blanket prohibition on any in-
crease, several exceptions should be noted. It is submitted that an
exception should be made where the original sentence was below
the statutory minimum and defendant must be resentenced as the
result of a new trial. It should be within the judge's power upon re-
Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J.
6o6 (1965) (the author of this article was defendant's counsel in Patton). Contra,
State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).
IQWith the credit rule, the maximum period that defendant may be required
to serve upon reconviction is the unserved time remaining on the original sentence.
In holding that a sentence may not be increased on retrial, the court brought about
a result that has found support only in recent years. See cases prohibiting increase
to death sentence on reconviction cited in note 31 supra; People v. Ali, 66 Adv.
Cal. 271, 424 P.2d 932, 57 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1967) (concurrent sentence cannot be
made consecutive on retrial); Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or
Conviction-A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. REv. 1, 22 (1963);
Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal
Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 6o6 (1965).
In January, 1967, the advisory committee of the American Bar Association issued
its tentative draft entitled STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVIcI7ON REMEDIEs as
part of the ABA's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. The com-
mittee in drafting the report recognized the problem in question and made pro-
vision therefor in § 6.3 to the same effect as Patton. Section 6. 3 provides:
Sentence on re-prosecution of successful applicants: credit for time
served.
(a) Where prosecution is initiated or resumed against an appli-
cant who has successfully sought post-conviction relief and a conviction
is obtained, or where a sentence has been set aside as -the result of a
successful application for post-conviction relief and the defendant
is to 'be resentenced, the sentencing court should not be empowered
to impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed.
(b) Credit should be given towards service of the minimum and
maximum term of any any new prison sentence for time served under a
sentence which has been successfully challenged in a post-conviction
proceeding.
The report as yet has not been endorsed by the Board of Directors of the ABA.
In addition, the Supreme Court has intimated that credit should be given for
time served. In United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), where defendants were
reindicted under a different statutory provision after they had been convicted
and incarcerated under the first indictment, the Court said: "In these circum-
stances, there is every reason to expect the sentencing judge to take the invalid
incarcerations into account in fashioning new sentences if appellees are again
convicted." 383 U.S. at 123. Futhermore, in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966),
the Supreme Court held that the right of appeal when given should be unob-
structed. See note 34 supra.
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trial to correct the sentence to bring it in accord with the minimum
statutory provision.5 A second exception lies in what charges the
defendant faces at the second trial.54 If wholly different charges are
brought against the defendant at the second trial, the judge should
then be allowed to levy a greater sentence.55
In Patton the court adopted three constitutional grounds for
proscribing an increase in sentence on retrial: (i) due process, (2)
equal protection, and (3) double jeopardy. Although any one of the
three would have been a sufficient basis for the court's decision, the
equal protection argument appears to be the most compelling.5 6
C. ALTON PHILLIPS
'3ln Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (igoo), defendant's original sentence
was set aside as unconstitutional, and he had to be resentenced under another
statute. The Court said: "And as the decision which he sought and obtained
involved the determination that he had been improperly sentenced under chapter
504 ... but should have been sentenced under antecedent statutes ... it followed that
the second sentence must be a new sentence to the extent of those differences, and
might turn out to be for a longer period of imprisonment." 177 U.S. at i6o.
In King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938), the sentence was below
the statutory minimum because the words "at hard labor" had been exluded. De-
fendant's sentence was increased partly because the words "at hard labor" were
included in the second sentence and the court allowed the increase. The court
said: "It is established that a sentence which has not been fully served, and no
separable part of which has been fully served, and which is void because it
imposes less than the statutory minimum, may be corrected to conform to the
statute.... A rule might be adopted which would permit a sentence to be increased
only so far as necessary to bring it into conformity with the statute." 98 F.2d at
296. See Bozza v. United States, 33o U.S. i6o (1947); Coy v. Johnston, x36 F.2d 818
(9th Cir. 1943); Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A
Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. R.Ev. 1, 26, 35 (1964)-
"An increase on a conviction of a lesser included offense for apparent reasons
should be impermissible. Under the rule of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957), a defendant cannot be convicted of a greater included offense on retrial.
Thus, an increase on this basis is necessarily precluded in the federal system.
'See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965); State v. Squires,
248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 6oi (1966) (increase based on conviction of three additional
charges allowed). In Boyce the defendant obtained a new trial and, on his request,
was tried for two other outstanding charges against him. The court ruled that an
increase in sentence was permissible where defendant had been convicted of
additional charges.
The Supreme Court in dealing with unreasonable distinctions placed in the
way of appellate review has often relied on the equal protection clause to remove
the obstacle. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
